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INTRODUCTION
Unanimous verdicts have long been the fascination of lawyers and academics. The history behind the unanimous verdict
requirement, the benefits and detriments of such a requirement, and alternative methods are all vigorously debated. A
foray into Jewish/Talmudic law1 introduces a puzzling twist in

1

Before such a foray:
[a] brief historical review will familiarize the new reader of Jewish law
with its history and development. The Pentateuch (the five books of
Moses, the Torah) is the elemental document of Jewish law and, according to Jewish legal theory, was revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai. The
Prophets and Writings, the other two parts of the Hebrew Bible, were
written over the next 700 years, and the Jewish canon was closed
around the year 200 before the Common Era (“B.C.E.”). The close of the
canon until year 250 of the Common Era (“C.E.”) is referred to as the
era of the Tannaim, the redactors of Jewish law, whose period closed
with the editing of the Mishnah by Rabbi Judah the Patriarch. The
next five centuries were the epoch in which scholars called Amoraim
(“those who recount” Jewish law) and Savoraim (“those who ponder”
Jewish law) wrote and edited the two Talmuds (Babylonian and Jerusalem). The Babylonian Talmud is of greater legal significance than the
Jerusalem Talmud and is a more complete work.
The post-Talmudic era is conventionally divided into three periods: (1)
the era of the Geonim, scholars who lived in Babylonia until the mideleventh century; (2) the era of the Rishonim (the early authorities),
who lived in North Africa, Spain, Franco-Germany, and Egypt until the
end of the fourteenth century; and (3) the period of the Aharonim (the
latter authorities), which encompasses all scholars of Jewish law from
the fifteenth century up to this era. From the period of the midfourteenth century until the early seventeenth century, Jewish law underwent a period of codification, which led to the acceptance of the law
code format of Rabbi Joseph Karo, called the Shulhan Arukh, as the basis for modern Jewish law. The Shulhan Arukh (and the Arba'ah Turim
of Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, which preceded it) divided Jewish law into
four separate areas: Orah Hayyim is devoted to daily, Sabbath, and holiday laws; Even HaEzer addresses family law, including financial aspects; Hoshen Mishpat codifies financial law; and Yoreh Deah contains
dietary laws as well as other miscellaneous legal matter. Many significant scholars - themselves as important as Rabbi Karo in status and
authority - wrote annotations to his code which made the work and its
surrounding comments the modern touchstone of Jewish law. The most
recent complete edition of the Shulhan Arukh (Vilna, 1896) contains no
less than 113 separate commentaries on the text of Rabbi Karo. In addition, hundreds of other volumes of commentary have been published
as self-standing works, a process that continues to this very day. Besides the law codes and commentaries, for the last 1200 years, Jewish
law authorities have addressed specific questions of Jewish law in written responsa (in question and answer form). Collections of such respon-
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the unanimous verdict discussion. The Talmud rules that a
unanimous verdict by the Sanhedrin (Jewish court) must be
thrown out and the defendant must be exonerated! The alleged
guilt of the defendant is immaterial and the killer walks away
a free man. Such an illogical outcome seems strikingly out of
place within the logical Talmud. Yet, a closer look at this law
reveals that this quizzical result is actually quite rational. In
fact, understanding the logic behind this surprising law sheds
light on numerous aspects of modern legal theory. Part I of
this paper will provide background information regarding the
current academic discussion surrounding the unanimous verdict. Part II will discuss the startling Talmudic passage on the
unanimous verdict. It will additionally focus on one explanation that radically reinterprets this passage. Part IIIA will introduce two schools of thought on the rationale behind the antiunanimity rule. Part IIIB will highlight two areas of modern
legal theory affected by such rationales.
I. THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT IN AMERICAN LAW
A. History of Unanimity
One of the earliest recorded unanimous jury verdicts was
in Europe in the year 1367.2 By the eighteenth century, unanimous verdicts were “an accepted feature of the common-law
jury.”3 Today, under American law, unanimous jury verdicts
4
are required in federal felony trials and in many state trials as
5
well. In 1972, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the United States Supreme
Court posited four possible theories for the unanimity requiresa have been published, providing guidance not only to later authorities
but also to the community at large. Finally, since the establishment of
the State of Israel in 1948, the rabbinical courts of Israel have published their written opinions deciding cases on a variety of matters.
Michael J. Broyde, The Foundations of Law: A Jewish Law View of World
Law, 54 Emory L.J. 79, 80 n.3 (2005).
2 Jeremy Osher, Note, Jury Unanimity in California: Should It Stay or
Should It Go?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1326 (1996).
3 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1972).
4 FED.. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
5 See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the
Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 615 (2007); see
also Emil J. Bove III, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in Anti-Deadlock Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J.251 (2008).
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ment.6 The first theory was that the rule was “designed to
compensate for lack of procedural safeguards ensuring that the
defendant received a fair trial.”7 The second theory was that
the rule “developed from the practice of afforcement of the jury
which was firmly established by the late 14th century.”8 This
simply “meant that a sufficient number were to be added to the
panel until 12 were at last found to agree in the same conclusion.”9 A third possibility was that “unanimity developed because early juries, unlike juries today, personally had
knowledge of the facts of a case; the medieval mind assumed
there could be only one correct view of the facts, and, if either
all the jurors or only a minority thereof declared the facts erro10
neously, they might be punished for perjury.”
Lastly, “unanimity may have arisen out of the medieval concept of consent
which carried with it the idea of unanimity.”11
Regardless of the exact reason behind the rise of the unanimous jury verdict system, “the unanimous jury has been so
embedded in our legal history that no one would question its
constitutional position.”12 Unanimous conviction of the accused
has largely remained “sacred and inviolate.”13
B. Benefits of Unanimity
Supporters of the unanimous verdict often extol the many
benefits of such a system. First, requiring every juror to agree
on the verdict ensures that the minority opinion is heard, discussed, and analyzed until the entire group is adequately con14
vinced of its flaws.
Second, unanimous verdicts protect the integrity of our

6

Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2.
Osher, supra note 2, at 1326 n.37 (citing Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. (quoting Apocada, 406 U.S. at 408).
11 Id. (citing Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2).
12 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 382 n.1 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13 Osher, supra note 2, at 1339 (quoting Bill Boyarsky, Balky Trial Could
Ignite Move to Radically Alter Jury System, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at
A18).
14 Jere Morehead, A “Modest” Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination
of Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 KAN. L. REV. 933, 943 (1998).
7
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legal system as they “represent the rational and reasoned
judgment of all twelve jurors.”15 When all of the jurors agree
on an outcome, the public feels that the jurors “fully deliberated the case and that the resulting verdict is just.”16 The rule
removes the misconception that the “the government . . .
abuse[s] its power and wrongly convict[s] people who aren’t
guilty.”17
Lastly, proponents of the unanimous verdict requirement
often cite the system’s impressive history when discussing its
virtues.18 The fact that the unanimous verdict is required by
judiciaries in many countries and states surely points to its efficacy as well.
C. Detriments of Unanimity
Although many discuss the numerous benefits of the unanimity requirement, some have criticized this rule. Arguing
that “historical inertia should not prevent change,” these scholars have called for the abolishment of unanimity.19 Ironically,
England, the source of America’s unanimous verdict rule, no
longer requires such unanimity.20 Moreover, some critics note
that the unanimous jury requirement may be nothing more
than a historical accident.21 Critics of the unanimous jury
point to the large number of hung juries caused by such a requirement.22 Additionally, hung juries are costly, inefficient,
and they cause a backlog in the court docket.23 Removing unanimity requirements would allow courts to preserve a large

15

Osher, supra note 2, at 1363.
Id.; see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Majority Rule on Juries Would Increase
Errors, S.F. CHRON.., June 5, 1995, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/1995
-06-05/opinion/17809061_1_jury-splits-majority-rule-unanimity.
17 Osher, supra note 2, at 1363 (quoting Steve Wilson, Hung Juries Preferable to Those that Make Wrong Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1995, at
A2).
18 Id. at 1340.
19 Id.
20 Bill Boyarsky, Unanimous Verdicts Also On Trial, L.A. TIMES, July 19,
1995, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-07-19/news/mn25660_1_
simpson-trial.
21 State v. Gann, 463 P.2d 570, 573 (Or. 1969).
22 Osher, supra note 2.
23 Id.
16
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amount of wasted resources.
Lastly, critics of unanimity highlight the concern that
unanimous verdicts often lead to compromise convictions.24 As
jurors endeavor to decide the case, a stubborn juror can seriously delay reaching the verdict by holding out. Holding out
often causes the other jurors to make some sort of compromise,
perhaps lessening the conviction to a lower charge, in exchange
for the holdout juror’s guilty vote.25 Such a compromise is
viewed negatively by society as it does not represent an honest
view of the facts and legal issues involved. Rather, it is a cheap
bargain between disinterested parties.26
D. Observation about Unanimity Scholarship
Having discussed the pros and cons of requiring unanimous jury verdicts, one can offer an interesting observation.
While critics have offered multiple reasons unanimity should
not be required in jury verdicts, no critic has suggested that
once a verdict is unanimous it should be disallowed, with the
result of an acquittal. Since hung juries and compromise convictions may only be caused by requiring unanimity, presumably critics are in agreement that unanimity per se is not negative.
II. UNANIMOUS VERDICT IN TALMUDIC LAW
A. Talmudic Passage
In the midst of Tractate Sanhedrin,27 the Talmudic section
discussing the Jewish court system, an interesting law is stated:

24 See generally, JEFFREY ABRAMSON,
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 179 (1994).
25

WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM

See id.
Id.; see also Osher, supra note 2, at 1354.
27 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a. All citations and author
translations of the Babylonian Talmud in this paper will be from the Berman
edition of the Vilna printing (1995), which will be cited as ‘BABYLONIAN
TALMUD,’ followed by name of tractate, and page number. Citations and author translations of Talmudic commentaries, all of which are on file with the
author, will be cited in the following manner: Author, Title of Work, Subtitle
[if applicable] [,] Part or Page [,] (Edition, Year).
26
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R[abbi] Kahana said: If the Sanhedrin [Jewish court] unanimously find [the accused] guilty, he is acquitted. Why? — Because we
have learned by tradition that sentence must be postponed till
the morrow in hope of finding new points in favor of the defense.
But this cannot be anticipated in this case.28

The Talmud rules that a defendant who is unanimously found
guilty may walk away free!29 “Where the evidence of guilt appears indisputable, Jewish law frees the suspect.”30 Yet, a case
with weaker evidence, and thus containing a split amongst the
justices, results in a conviction. Academics have noted this irrational outcome, declaring that this “paradox is quite compelling.”31
While the Talmud does offer some rationale for this confusing law, it is still difficult to understand. The Talmud explains
that because the judges unanimously voted guilty, no new merits will be found to help the defendant. As such, the verdict is
thrown out. Yet, such an explanation is troubling at best.
While merits and defense arguments are important, perhaps
none exist in the present case. Why is the defendant acquitted
“on the basis of an apparent technicality?”32

28

Id.
Id. Importantly, there is a dispute amongst Talmudic commentators
concerning the application of this rule. Some feel that this anti-unanimity
rule is limited to the highest appellate court, the Great Sanhedrin of 71 judges. See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Ohr Sameach, Laws of Sanhedrin 9:1 (Warsaw ed. 1926) (positing that Maimonides limits the anti-unanimity rule to the
Great Sanhedrin to highlight that the defendant is completely exonerated, as
opposed to a lower Sanhedrin, where it would simply be appealed). But see
David Ibn Zimra, RaDBaZ, Laws of Sanhedrin 9:1 (Wagshal ed. 1984) (applying this law even to trial courts of 23 judges); see Meir Dan Plotsky, Kli
Chemdah, Devarim 4 (Pietrikow ed., 1927); see Avraham Duber Cahana
Shapiro, Dvar Avraham, Book 2 Ch. 34:3-4 (Warsaw ed., 1906). For the sake
of the comparison to the modern jury, this article accepts the latter opinion.
30 Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly
Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 619 (1991).
31 Id.
32 Id. Although this author has not found any commentator who explicitly understands the Talmudic passage this way, an argument can be made
that the unanimity law is an example of formalism. While potentially illogical, it is simply a product of procedure and thus fits into the rubric of formalism. A fuller explanation of formalism is outside the scope of this article.
29

2013]

THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT

323

B. A Radical Reaction to this Puzzling Law
The brilliant Talmudic commentators are understandably
troubled by this puzzling anti-unanimity law.33 Accordingly,
one Talmudic commentator radically reinterprets this passage
by reviewing the simple meaning of the text. The Aramaic
word use in this Talmudic passage is “potrin,” literally understood to mean “exonerated.” However, Meir Halevi Abulafia
(RaMah), a medieval scholar, offers a different translation.34
Noting that the word potrin is also sporadically used in Talmudic literature to mean “sent away,” the RaMah explains the
Talmud in the following rational way: “If the Sanhedrin [Jewish court] unanimously find [the accused] guilty, he is ‘sent
away,’ - killed immediately.”35 Since a unanimous verdict
shows that the defendant is definitely guilty, there is no need
to delay the defendant’s execution. In other words, the RaMah
understands the Talmud as a proponent of unanimous verdicts,
not as an opponent to them. Avoiding any irrational interpretation, the RaMah conveniently regards our passage as a classical law supporting unanimous verdicts. Such an opinion fits
nicely with modern American law.36
III. FINDING RATIONALITY IN IRRATIONALITY
Notwithstanding the RaMah’s novel reinterpretation, the
Talmud has surprisingly acquitted a unanimously convicted defendant. Can rationality be found within this troubling law?
Two alternative approaches emerge among the great Talmudic
commentators in understanding our passage. Through their

33 Although the term “anti-unanimity law” is imprecise, as it suggests
that the Talmud did not allow unanimous verdicts at all, I use this term as
shorthand for this puzzling Talmudic law only as to not break the flow of this
article.
34 See Meir Halevi Abulafia, Yad RaMah, Sanhedrin 17a (Shaulniki ed.,
1798); see also Asher ben Yechiel, Sanhedrin 17a (Berman ed., 1995) (quoting
this explanation in the name of the RaMah); Reuven Margolis, Margalios
HaYam, Sanhedrin 17a (Mossad HaRav Kook ed., 1996). But see Ha’aros, On
Yad RaMah (Mossad HaRav Kook ed., 1996) (arguing with this interpretation
of the Yad RaMah).
35 Abulafia, Sanhedrin 17a (Shaulniki ed., 1798); see also Baruch Halevi
Epstein, Torah Temimah, Mishpatim 23:2 (Romm ed., 1904) (bringing multiple examples of this usage throughout Talmudic literature).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
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creative explanations, these commentators shed a great deal of
light on modern legal thought and provide insight into certain
tenets of the Jewish justice system. Part IIIA will list two very
different approaches to finding rationality within the literal interpretation of this law. Part IIIB will then highlight some insights into modern legal philosophy resulting from each of
these two interpretations.
A. Two Distinct Approaches
1. Judicial Collusion
a. Explanation of Zvi Hirsh Chajes
Although surprisingly bold, nineteenth century scholar Zvi
Hirsh Chajes gives an easily understood answer.37 While
unanimous verdicts can be strong indicators of the defendant’s
guilt, Chajes takes the opposite approach. Connecting our law
to the next few lines of the text of Talmud, Chajes notes that a
judge on the Sanhedrin must be a brilliant thinker. In fact, the
Talmud elaborates that before gaining entry onto the bench, a
Sanhedrin judge must show that he is capable of providing a
cogent, logical argument for an impossible factual scenario. 38
The judge must prove that a certain dead animal, ritually impure according to the explicit text of the Bible, is actually ritually pure according to Jewish law. Chajes proves from here
that the responsibility of the Sanhedrin is to make the impossible argument.39 Noting the juxtaposition of these two Talmudic statements, Chajes explains that when a Sanhedrin
unanimously convicts a defendant, collusion must be suspected.
Since a verdict is reached without any dissenting opinion, the
judges on the Sanhedrin are not doing their job properly, as

37

1995).
38

Zvi Hirsh Chajes, MaHaratz Chiyus, Sanhedrin 17a (Berman ed.,

See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a.
Chajes further bolsters this understanding by comparing the Sanhedrin to the modern court systems in France and Britain. Chajes, supra note 37.
In these modern adversarial legal systems, a lawyer represents each side and
arguments are made in favor of one’s client, no matter how implausible. The
goal is to protect and defend ones client to the fullest. So too, the Sanhedrin
must analyze the facts and relevant laws to provide two sides of every story.
Id.
39
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they are not making the impossible arguments. As such, the
Sanhedrin’s unanimity is suspect and the verdict is dismissed.40
b. Explanation of Judah Loew
Judah Loew, a 16th century scholar, likewise interprets
this Talmudic law within the context of a fear of judicial collusion. Loew goes even further than Chajes, providing a deeper
rationale for the acquittal. According to Loew, the function of
the Sanhedrin is to search for “evidence of innocence rather
than guilt.”41 In other words, they “should not be so concerned
about punishing those who have committed a wrong. The court
should . . . stick to its business of finding merit in the defendant’s cause.”42 While in some cases, evidence pointing to the
defendant’s guilt is so strong that, that the defendant must be
found guilty, such a verdict “is simply incidental,” or “so as not
to pervert justice.”43 Thus, a Sanhedrin that unanimously
finds the defendant guilty and has not properly entertained the
possibility of his innocence is “simply not acting as a court.”44
This idea of upholding the character of the court system
explains a concern remaining even after Chajes and Loew’s explanations. Collusion may be a real concern in a unanimous
verdict. Still, the chance that exoneration may cause a guilty
party to walk away unpunished is equally disturbing. However, Loew subtly addresses this concern, responding that:
[P]reserving the court’s role as a righteous court that seeks to
free the innocent is more important than the incidental fact of

40 Id.; see also YECHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN, ARUCH HASHULCHAN [THE TABLE
SET] 18:7 (Simcha Fishbane ed., 1992). As an aside, it is not surprising that
Chajes offers this explanation. Although not necessarily disparaging every
Sanhedrin, this approach does take the daring step of entertaining that the
great Sanhedrin had the potential for collusion and dishonesty. This intellectually honest position fits well with Chajes, called by modern scholars a
“Traditionalist and Maskil.” See Bruria Hutner David, The Dual Role of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes: Traditionalist and Maskil (1971) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, Columbia University), available at http://www1.cs.columbia.edu
/~spotter/david-chajes.pdf.
41 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 619 n.88.
42 Id. at 621.
43 Id. at 619.
44 Id. at 621; see also NORMAN LAMM, HAGADDA: THE ROYAL TABLE 104
(Joel B. Wolowelsky ed., 2010).
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the defendant’s factual guilt. That we sometimes free guilty people is not significant. What is critical is preserving the character
45
of the court.

Loew’s weighing of judicial priorities, perhaps not “unanimous”
amongst legal authorities, at least further brings rationality to
this complex law.
2. Punishment as Spiritual Cleansing
An alternative way to approach this strange Talmudic acquittal is by looking at the reasons behind punishment. While
legal scholars, and thus consequently American jurisdictions,
differ about the exact purpose of punishment, two main ideas
are often discussed.46 One position opines a utilitarian outlook,
focusing on the general deterrence that results from punishment and viewing punishment in terms of the greater good of
society.47 A second position believes in retributive justice, that
it is morally acceptable to bestow benefit on the aggrieved party by punishment of the wrongdoer.48
Jewish law is the subject of a similar debate.49 Yet, an additional dimension, perhaps a subdivision of utilitarianism, is
frequently involved. Many Talmudic commentators view punishment as a means to “cleanse” the defendant of his sins, enabling him to continue striving for moral perfection.50 With this
understanding of punishment as a means to forgiveness, the
anti-unanimity requirement can be explained, albeit in two different ways.

45 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 622. Contra Epstein, supra
note 34 (harshly dismissing this explanation).
46 See Erik Luna, The Practice of Restorative Justice: Punishment Theory,
Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 205 (2003); see also CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 149 (2008).
47 See Luna, supra note 46, at 208-17.
48 See generally Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009).
49 See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Ohr Sameach, Laws of Murderers 6:12
(Warsaw ed., 1926); see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Makkos 2a & 9a;
Yom Tov Asevilli, Ritva, Makkos 9a (Wagshal ed., 1987); Birchas Avraham,
Tractate Makkos 2a & 9a (Jerusalem ed., 1993).
50 See Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, supra note 49.
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a. Explanation of Menachem Mendel Schneerson
Analogizing to another remarkable Talmudic law, Menachem Mendel Schneerson (d. 1994) clarifies our antiunanimity law.51 The Talmud states that two conspiring witnesses receive the same punishment that they were trying to
wrongly impose on a suspect if two other witnesses testify that
the conspiring witnesses are lying.52 The two other witnesses
know that the conspiring witnesses are lying because the conspiring witnesses were together with these other two witnesses
at the time the crime occurred, and therefore the conspiring
witnesses could not have witnessed the alleged crime. According to many commentators, however, the conspiring witnesses
are not punished if the suspect that they were trying to frame
was already punished.53 Although conspiring witnesses are
normally punished if they are caught before punishment is carried out on the framed individual, if they perform a worse evil
by actually causing the framed defendant’s punishment, they
are exonerated! Yosef Karo, a 16th century scholar, provides
rationale for this weird dichotomy based on his opinion of the
purpose of punishment.54 Since punishment is meant to help
cleanse a defendant’s soul, a defendant whose crimes are exceptionally egregious (i.e., cause an innocent individual to actually be punished) does not deserve to be punished. Rather,
he must walk free, leaving his punishment in the hands of the
Lord – a surely worse fate. Likewise, explains Schneerson, a
defendant unanimously convicted is undeserving of punishment by the hands of mere mortals.55 Instead, this heinous
criminal must be judged by the Master Judge, the Lord himself. Thus, this perplexing Talmudic statement is actually
quite rational.

51

See Chaya Shuchat, Unanimous Verdict, MEANINGFUL LIFE CENTER,
http://www.meaningfullife.com/torah/parsha/devarim/shoftim/Unanimous_Ve
rdict.php#_edn10 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
52 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Makkos 2b.
53 In Aramaic this phenomenon is called “Ka’asher Zamam, v’Lo Ka’asher
Asa.” See Shlomo Yitzhaki, Rashi, Makkos 2b (Berman ed., 1995); cf. Tosfos,
Makkos 2b (Berman ed., 1995).
54 See Yosef Karo, Kesef Mishnah, Laws of Testimony 20:2 (Wagshal ed.,
1984).
55 Shuchat, supra note 51.
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b. Explanation of Menachem Mendel Morgenstern
Menachem Mendel Morgenstern (“Kotzker Rebbe”) also
understands this unanimity problem based on the idea of punishment as a mode of forgiveness and spiritual cleansing, albeit
from a different angle.56 While Morgenstern agrees with
Schneerson that the point of punishment is to cleanse a defendant’s soul, Morgenstern differs on how this cleansing occurs. He posits that the point of Sanhedrin is to help a person
come to the internal realization that he committed a wrong and
to truly regret his actions.57 Usually, punishment is the ideal
method to bring about this realization. However, when Sanhedrin unanimously convicts a defendant of egregious behavior, punishment is unnecessary. When the defendant sees that
all the judges find him guilty, without even one judge finding
merit in his actions, he will surely regret his actions, thus obviating the need for punishment. Although perhaps overly favorable in his assessment of the inherent goodness of human
behavior,58 Morgenstern’s explanation of our law is clearly rational.
B. Application to Modern Legal Theory
While there is intense scholarly debate about whether Jewish law can be compared to the modern legal system,59 many
articles and studies have been written detailing the similarities
and contrasts of the two systems.60 Thus, once the logic behind

56 Menachem Mendel Morgenstern, Emes Mikotzk Titzmach 62 (Netzach
ed., 1961).
57 Id.
58 See generally JOSEPH FOX, RABBI MENACHEM MENDEL OF KOTZK: A
BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF THE CHASIDIC MASTER (1988), available at
http://itethics.tripod.com/kotzk.pdf. Ironically, Morgenstern is known for his
sharp-witted sayings and for his impatience for false piety. His interpretation
of this Talmudic passage seems to be contrary of this outlook. Id.
59 See Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text; The Turn to the
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 813 (1993).
60 See id.; Chad Baruch, A Critique of Reliance Upon Jewish Law to Support Capital Punishment in the United States, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 41,
42 n.8 (2000) (quoting e.g., Steven Friedell, The “Different Voice” in Jewish
Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L. J. 915 (1992));
BERNARD MEISLIN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN AMERICAN LAW, IN JEWISH LAW
AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 109 (Nahum Rakover, ed. 1984); Perry Dane,
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a non-unanimous verdict requirement has been established,
the law’s relevance to modern legal theory can be analyzed. A
closer look at the two divergent approaches explaining the rationality in the Talmud’s anti-unanimity law reveals that certain well known ideas from the works of two popular legal theorists are intertwined in this Talmudic passage.
1. Max Weber
a. Four Types of Legal Systems
A very influential sociologist of the late nineteenth century, Max Weber had a profound impact on legal theory through
his studies of the history of economics and its complex relationship to legal development.61 In Economics and Society, Weber’s
groundbreaking book on this subject, he details at length “how
legal forms are shaped by economic and social forces and vice
versa.”62 In doing so, Weber outlines a basic “typology of law
based on different modes of legal thought,” providing a vivid
picture of the evolution of the law over time.63

Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987);
John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 237 (1987); Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of
the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra
note 30; Suzanne L. Stone, Siniatic and Noahide Law: Legal Pluralism in
Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1157 (1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, Jurisprudence in the Light of the Hebraic Faith, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 77 (1984); Bernard J. Meislin, Jewish Law in American Tribunals, 7
ISRAELI L. REV. 349 (1972); Dena S. Davis, Method in Jewish Bioethics: An
Overview, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 325 (1994); Joshua Fruchter, Doctors on Trial: A
Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Approaches to Medical Malpractice, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 453 (1993); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture”-Circumstantial
Evidence, Then and Now, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Gordon J. Beggs,
Proverbial Practice: Legal Ethics from Old Testament Wisdom, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 831 (1995); Shael Herman, The “Equity of the Statute” and
Ratio Scripta: Legislative Interpretation Among Legislative Agnostics and
True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REV. 535 (1994); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 (1994).
61 SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 20-27 (2000), available at http://books.google.com/books/about/Law_and_Social_Change.html?
id=5Xk96podfLkC.
62 Id. at 22.
63 Id. at 23.
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Weber’s typology consists of four different categories of the
law, each one leading into the next, resulting in a modern, formal and rational legal system.64 The first category, which Weber calls “formal irrationality,” is when judges “apply means
that are beyond the control of reason.”65 The paradigm of “formal irrationality” is law based on prophecy or on an oracle.66
Although this system relies on a formal, structured lawmaking
body (i.e., prophet), its primitiveness is highlighted by the lack
of logic inherent to any law.
The second category, “substantive irrationality,” is when
“decisions are influenced by concrete factors of the particular
case evaluated in terms of ethical, emotional, or political values
67
rather than general norms.”
Weber cites to the Kadi, the
Middle Eastern Islamic judge, as the prototype “substantive irrationality” lawmaker.68 As the Kadi shied away from general
rules, instead focusing on “particular merits of individual case,”
many decisions were based on emotional or political considerations.69
Weber’s third category, called “substantive rationality,”
has best been described as a system “where legal decisions are
made in reference to rules that reflect value commitments or
ethical imperatives, for example a set of codified religious rules
or a political ideology.”70 Some have classified the Talmud as
an example of “substantive rationality,” as the Talmud contains numerous laws stemming from a certain moral and ethical requirement.71
The most sophisticated legal system of “formal rationality,”
Weber’s fourth category, consists of universally applied rules,
laws and regulations.72 This system is as “an orientation to the
world which expresses itself by imposing order on reality in

64

Nancy L. Schwartz, Max Weber’s Philosophy, 93 YALE L.J. 1386, 138788 (1984) (book review).
65 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 23.
66 Id. at 24.
67 Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1388.
68 ANLEU, supra note 61.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1395.
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strict numerical, calculable terms.”73 Weber viewed contemporary Western law as the paradigm of this system.74
b. Sanhedrin, Substantive Rationality and the Inquisitorial
System
The Sanhedrin, in many ways, operated as a typical “substantive rationality” system. One important characteristic of
the Sanhedrin in which this is highlighted is its “inquisitorial”
nature.75 In the familiar, adversarial court system in America,
the lawyers have the responsibility of establishing and clarifying the facts. By contrast, the role of a judge of the Sanhedrin
was to be a “fact finder” as well as a judge. This added responsibility, common in many European countries today, is emblematic of a “substantive rationality” system.76 As judges
have greater scope for intervention, the inquisitorial system
truly illuminates how “value commitments or ethical imperatives” can play a major role in decisions.77
c. Sanhedrin, Substantive Rationality and Legal Guilt
Substantive rationality is also found in the Sanhedrin by
examining the concept of legal guilt. Legal scholars distinguish
between two types of guilt: factual guilt and legal guilt.78 Factual guilt is whether or not someone actually committed a
crime. Legal guilt is whether or not enough evidence is provided to prove that someone actually committed the crime.79 An
important goal of a legal system built around legal guilt is to
ensure that innocent people are never wrongly convicted of a
crime, even if that means some more guilty people go free as a

73 KENNETH L. MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF
MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 356 (2006), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=sya6fxO6zgC&q=357#v=onepage&q=strict%20numerical&f=false.
74 ANLEU, supra note 62, at 26.
75 See Accusatory and Inquisitional Procedure, JEWISHENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/725-accusatory-and-inquisitorialprocedure (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
76 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 24.
77 Id.
78 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010).
79 Id. at 1657.
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consequence.80
Loew’s statement about the Sanhedrin’s goal to “free the
innocent” being “more important than the incidental fact of the
defendant’s factual guilt” speaks to the essence of legal guilt.81
According to Loew, an acquittal for a unanimous verdict due to
potential collusion is necessary to ensure the integrity of the
judicial system.82 Public confidence in the judicial system is
such an important ideal that a defendant who is likely guilty
can walk free because of it: a key tenet of a legal guilt system.
Thus, the Sanhedrin seemingly gave more weight to legal guilt
than factual guilt.
Viewing the Sanhedrin in the legal guilt context fits very
nicely with the Sanhedrin’s “substantive rationality” component. Preserving the character of the court at the expense of
not finding the defendant guilty of a crime that he likely committed typifies the “substantive rationality” idea of a “reference
to a substantive goal” instead of an “application of abstract
rules.”83 Requiring a dissenting opinion to ensure the credibility of the legal system at large imposes an extraneous ethical
imperative not found in abstract rules. As such, Loew’s explanation of this Talmudic passage is another sign of the “substantive rationality” inherent in the Sanhedrin.
d. Formal Rationality and the Non-unanimous Verdict
The theme of “substantive rationality” of the Sanhedrin is
what makes the unanimity law so striking. A unanimity requirement for verdicts generally indicates “substantive rationality,” as unanimity signifies “a collective subjective response
84
to the facts as presented.”
This “collective subjective response” stems from jurors’ personal feelings or value judg-

80 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 149 (2011).
81 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 30.
82 See id.
83 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 23-24; see also Barry C. Feld, The Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and
the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1227 n.164
(1989).
84 ANLEU, supra note 61, at 26.
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ments, rather than any formal decision making process.85 For
this reason, Weber viewed “substantive rationality” as more
primitive than “formal rationality,” the beacon of the modern
legal system.86
Quite possibly, the anti-unanimity Talmudic law is meant
to combat this primitiveness. Chajes understood the antiunanimity rule as protecting against judicial collusion, or perhaps, against this “collective subjective response.” By requiring the judges to provide at least one argument in defense of
the accused, the Talmud was advocating for a more formal system of decision-making, unhindered by pure emotion.87 To use
Weber’s terminology, the anti-unanimity requirement was thus
an injection of “formal rationality” into a highly “substantive
rationality” system.
2. Ronald Dworkin
a. Judicial Discretion
Ronald Dworkin, an influential modern legal philosopher,
has written extensively on the role of judges as legal decision
makers.88 In Dworkin’s manifesto, Taking Rights Seriously, he
discusses the interplay between the arbiter and the preservation of certain fundamental rights for the defendant.89
Dworkin argues that “claims of right” should “trump” utilitarian arguments in matters of morality and politics. Cast as arguments of principle, in law, they cannot be defeated by arguments of social policy.90 As such, Dworkin views a judge’s role
85

Id. at 27.
Id.at 26.
87 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sanhedrin 17a. Chajes himself alludes to this phenomenon. Chajes, supra note 37. By comparing the Sanhedrin and its inquisitorial system to the modern public defenders of the French
and British adversarial legal systems, Chajes shows how the anti-unanimity
requirement bridges the gap between the two systems. Both systems are
more focused on “formal rationality,” preferring that decisions are free of subjective, moral imperatives. While the adversarial system employs the public
defender to prevent against the “collective subjective response,” the Sanhedrin utilizes the anti-unanimity requirement to ensure the same outcome. Id.
88 See Rolf Sartorius, Dworkin on Rights and Utilitarianism, 1981 UTAH
L. REV. 263, 263 (1981).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 264; see Paul Yowell, A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theo86
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in assigning fault and punishment to the accused individual as
an end unto itself, and not as a means to a larger social end.91
Punishment is not to be used solely as a means of protection for
society.92
b. Dworkin and the Chassidic Outlook on Punishment
Dworkin’s view of punishment as an “end[]” and not as a
“means” is reflective of the aforementioned approach of punishment as a spiritual cleanser. To interpret the startling antiunanimity Talmudic law, Schneerson explains that this egregious defendant is undeserving of spiritual purification and is
therefore freed.93 Morgenstern goes to the opposite extreme,
understanding that in a case of such egregious misconduct punishment is unnecessary, as this defendant will surely repent
when he hears of his unanimous conviction.94
Yet, both interpretations are not bothered by the fact that
a horrible murderer may be let loose, as protection of society is
not a consideration when delivering punishment. Once the
“ends” of punishment are received by the defendant, any goal of
punishment as a “means” to protect society is meaningless.
Dworkin’s idea of utilitarian considerations being “trumped” by
an individual right is the lesson of our startling anti-unanimity
passage.
c. Puzzling Scenario as Proof to Dworkin
Further introspection into the perplexing Talmudic pas95
sage reveals a certain bizarre legal scenario.
Envision that
twenty-two out of the twenty-three justices on the Sanhedrin
have just voted that a defendant is guilty of murder. However,
the twenty-third, and final, justice believes that the accused is
innocent. How should this last justice vote? If he votes guilty,
ry of Rights, 52 AM. J. JURIS 93, 95 (2007).
91 STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 65 (1991), available at http://books.
google.com/books?id=X1hkTzw41PoC.
92 Id.; see also Yowell, supra note 90, at 117.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
95 See Yosef Babad, Minchas Chinuch, Commandment 78 (Machon Jerusalem ed, 1988) (discussing this dilemma and leaving it unresolved); see also
Dovid Tzvi Zahman, Minchas Soles 287 (Belgoraj ed., 1934).
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against what he believes to be the truth, the defendant will be
acquitted due to our anti-unanimity rule. However, if the justice votes what he earnestly believes, a vote of “innocent,” the
defendant will be convicted and executed under a majority decision of twenty-three against one. A truly strange dilemma!
Chaim ibn Attar (“Ohr HaChaim”) solves this dilemma by
understanding the Biblical verse commanding one to “follow
the majority” as requiring the twenty-third justice to vote “innocent.”96 Expounding on the goal of true justice, Chaim ibn
Attar posits that a judge must not think of larger social policy
considerations when deciding a case.97 The judge is required to
vote his belief on the case at hand, never looking at the effect of
his vote. This is the meaning of the commandment to follow
the majority – follow the majority even if you have another way
to effectuate certain social policies.98
Chaim ibn Attar’s lesson, that every individual case must
be judged as the “end” to itself and not as a “means” to a larger
social policy goal, is virtually identical to Dworkin’s legal theory. Interestingly, Chaim ibn Attar, like Schneerson and Morgenstern, extrapolates such a concept from this fascinating anti-unanimity Talmudic passage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unanimous verdicts have long been the subject of much
scholarly literature. While a large part of scholarly discussion
centers on whether a unanimity requirement for verdicts is
beneficial or detrimental to the legal system, the Talmud has a
novel approach. The Talmud’s view that unanimous verdicts
result in an acquittal is, at first glance, very troubling. Yet, after analyzing multiple potential rationales for this confusing
law, the anti-unanimity of the Talmud sheds light on two important legal theories. Highlighting Weber’s “formal rationality” and Dworkin’s “ends/means” theories, this Talmudic law
can be very helpful to modern legal philosophers. Instead of an
arcane, irrational rule, the anti-unanimity of the Sanhedrin is
actually a brilliant lesson in legal theory.

Chaim ibn Attar, Ohr Hachaim, Mishpatim 23:2 (Petrekov ed., 1889).
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